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Abstract 
This paper provides evidence on the response of interest rates to Federal budget deficits.  
A simple model is presented that incorporates the role of monetary policy in the determination of 
short-run interest rates and that ascribes the effects of government budget imbalances on the term 
structure of interest rates to uncertainty about the expected evolution of inflation and real interest 
rates.  Empirical results support the view that the term structure of interest rates is affected by 
Federal budget deficits, with a significant positive response of intermediate- and long-term 
interest rates relative to short-term rates in response to budget deficits.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
The issue of the role of budget deficits and their effects on the economy is one of the 
most-debated topics in economics.  Much of the debate has focused explicitly on the role of the 
U.S. Federal budget in the determination of domestic long-term interest rates.  A broad literature 
exists.  Some argue that the current and expected Federal budget position plays a significant role 
in the determination of interest rates.  Others argue that no observable relationship exists.  
Ultimately, because of the competing theoretical views and possible channels, the question of 
how the government budget affects interest rates requires an empirical answer. 
Some studies have found significant positive relationships between Federal deficits and 
interest rates, including Hoelscher (1986), Miller and Russek (1991, 1996), and Cebula and Koch 
(1994).  Weak or mixed results were observed by others; for example Evans (1985, 1987a, 
1987b), Plosser (1987), and Zimmerman (1997) found little or no significant effects of deficits 
on interest rates.  Some authors have attempted to overcome some of the typical empirical 
problems by examining the response of interest rates and other financial variables to Federal 
budget announcements (Wachtel and Young (1987), Kitchen (1996)).  Such evidence points to a 
significant relationship between Federal budget deficits and interest rates, but with only small 
effects.  Elmendorf (1996) also presented evidence that the response of interest rates to news 
about deficits revealed a positive relationship between deficits and interest rates.  In general, the 
evidence in the literature for a positive and significant relationship between budget deficits and 
interest rates is mixed at best, and certainly does not appear to be “robust” to changing 
specifications and time periods. 1 
                                                 
1 An exhaustive review of the literature is beyond the scope of this paper.  In addition to the articles cited in the text, 
the interested reader is also referred to Barro(1989), Bernheim (1987), Seater (1993). 
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Despite the uncertain relationship in the academic literature, the traditional view of a 
positive relationship between deficits and interest rates carries much weight in policy 
discussions.  Fed Chairman Greenspan, for example, has publicly stated his view that higher 
Federal deficits are associated with higher interest rates.  In a speech given January 11, 2002, 
Greenspan stated: 
“Some of this stimulus has likely been offset by increases in long-term market 
interest rates, including those on home mortgages.  The recent rise in these rates 
largely reflects the perception of improved prospects for the U.S. economy.  But 
over the past year, some of the firmness of long-term interest rates probably is the 
consequence of the fall of projected budget surpluses and the implied less-rapid 
paydowns of Treasury debt.” 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also typically has perceived a positive 
relationship between the Federal budget deficit and interest rates.  For example, in 1995 the CBO 
projected that the adoption of a balanced budget would yield a beneficial reduction in long-term 
interest rates.  CBO projected a decline in long-term interest rates of 170 basis points in 2002 for 
eliminating a $350 billion deficit in 2002 (3.5 percent of GDP), or about 48 basis points per one 
percentage point change in the deficit as a share of GDP.2,3 
This paper provides additional evidence on the responses of the term structure of interest 
rates to Federal budget deficits.  A simple model is presented that incorporates the role of 
monetary policy in the determination of short-run interest rates, ascribing the effects of 
                                                 
2 The Economic and Budget Outlook:  An Update, August 1995:  “Economic and Budgetary Implications of 
Balancing the Budget,” pp. 36, 42-45. 
3 A recent paper by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) found a similar size of response in the term structure of 
Treasury security yields, with long-term yields falling relative to short-term rates by about 55 basis points for every 
percentage point of projected budget surplus relative to GDP.  As cited in their paper, the specification employed by 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) was based in part on the preliminary work that was the basis of this paper. 
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government budget imbalances to uncertainty about the expected evolution of inflation and real 
interest rates.  Empirical results support the view that the term structure of interest rates is 
affected by Federal budget deficits, with a significant positive response of intermediate- and 
long-term interest rates relative to short-term rates in response to budget deficits.  
 
II.  A Simple Model 
 An observed regularity in the way that short- and long-term economic forecasts are made 
reveals that most forecasters anticipate that any short-run deviation from the economy’s long-run 
growth path will be eliminated over a relatively short period of time, with the economy thereafter 
assumed to return to its long-run equilibrium growth path.  The model presented here is a simple 
one that is consistent with that behavior yet that also will provide a specification that can be used 
in an empirical analysis that avoids many typical estimation problems. 
 Consider a simple two period model.  The first period is a short-run “disequilibrium” 
period, and the second period represents the long-run when variables are expected to converge to 
their targeted and equilibrium levels.  The assumption of convergence in the second period is 
implicitly a joint assumption of a stable economy and monetary policy “credibility” – that is, 
market participants expect the monetary authorities to ultimately succeed in attaining their 
targets.  For example, the Federal Reserve often refers to its “long run goals of price stability and 
sustainable economic growth.”4  The behavior of public and private forecasters (e.g, the Blue 
Chip, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the CBO) is also largely consistent 
with this approach, with short-run economic forecasts typically projecting the elimination of 
output and unemployment gaps, and longer-run projections showing growth at the economy’s 
potential with steady inflation and interest rates. 
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In the first period, the monetary authority adjusts the one period, short-term interest rate 
in response to deviations of inflation and output from their targeted or equilibrium levels, as in a 
Taylor (1993) rule type equation: 
 
)()()1( 1, tttt yyri −+−++= βππαπ  
 
where it,1 is the one-period (short-term) nominal interest rate in period t; r is the one-period real 
rate of interest; πt is the one-period inflation rate in period t; yt is the natural log of real output in 
period t; a “bar” over a variable represents a targeted equilibrium level; and α and β are 
monetary policy parameters that represent the policy adjustments to the short-term interest rate 
associated with inflation deviations from target (α) and with the deviation of actual output from 
potential (commonly referred to as the “output gap”) (β). 
Because the second period is an expected equilibrium period in which inflation is 
expected to return to its targeted level and output is expected to return to potential: 
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An equation for the spread between the long-term (two period) and short-term (one period) term 
interest rates from the term structure can be written as: 
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4 Federal Reserve Press Release, August 13, 2002. 
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where σt,2 is a term premium set in period t for the 2-period horizon.  For the purposes of this 
paper, we define the term premium, σt,2, as: 
 
2,2,2,2,)4( tttt εγλσ ++=  
 
where λt,2 is the usual liquidity premium over the term to maturity, γt,2 is a risk premium resulting 
from the financial uncertainty associated with government budget deficits, and εt,2 is a term that 
captures other unidentified (random) risk factors.  Combining equations 1 – 4, and simplifying 
yields: 
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In this simple framework, with the assumption that market participants expect the 
economy to return to its long-run equilibrium growth path after a short-run deviation, equation 
(5) shows that the spread between long- and short-term government interest rates is largely 
determined by four factors:  (1) current inflation; (2) the current output gap; (3) a liquidity 
premium; and (4) a risk premium related primarily to financial uncertainty associated with the 
government’s financial position.  A framework with a more general representation of the 
transition periods in the term to maturity would perhaps provide a more detailed view of the 
dynamic path.  Nonetheless, the general interpretation and the variables of interest for the 
empirical specification would not be affected. 
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 Note that this framework does not explicitly account for the possible effects of 
government budget deficits on the key economic variables other than interest rates.  Rather, this 
approach attributes the effect of the deficits to the uncertainty that market participants have 
regarding their possible effects.  In the short run, the Taylor rule view of the determination of 
short-term interest rates does not assign a direct role to the effect of government budget 
variables.  Rather, any effect of the government budget deficit only would occur indirectly 
through the deficit’s possible effects on the output gap, a highly uncertain relationship in 
contemporaneous periods.  Over longer periods of time, economic theory suggests several 
possible channels for the effects of budget deficits on future economic variables.  For example, 
in a long-run Solow growth model without full offsets from international financial flows or 
Ricardian private savings behavior, a higher government budget deficit would produce a lower 
national saving rate, higher real interest rates, and lower investment and capital stock.5  In our 
framework, market participants would still anticipate that the real output gap would be 
eliminated in the long run even if that equilibrium path were at a lower overall level of output.   
Alternatively, the monetary authority may accommodate the government deficits, leading to 
higher inflation over the relevant term for the determination of interest rates.  This inflation 
effect could occur even if monetary authorities have a high degree of credibility because of the 
uncertain nature of economic information and the monetary authority’s ability to interpret it.6  
For example, the monetary authority does not know precisely what the size of the output gap is at 
any given time; real GDP estimates are regularly revised by substantial amounts and great 
                                                 
5 For an example of this approach see Economic Report of the President (1994), p. 85-87. 
6 Much debate exists in the recent literature about the role of fiscal policy in the determination of the price level, 
e.g., see Woodford (2001).  
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uncertainty exists about the potential growth path for real GDP as well.7   As a result, market 
participants are not able to form precise expectations about the effects of the government budget 
position on future real interest rates and inflation.  Rather, the uncertainty leads to a general 
response of long-term rates relative to short-term rates – that is, a change in a risk premium that 
captures the uncertainty about the expected real interest rate and inflation effects.8  
 
III.  Empirical Evidence 
To empirically examine the relationships described above the following specification 
based on equation (5) was used: 
 
tjtkt eGOVSURPgGDPGAPLbINFLacii ++++=− )()6( ,,  
where: 
it,k represents the yield on longer-term Treasury securities (k = 1, 3, 5, and 10 years); 
it,j is the interest rate on the short-term Treasury security, the 3-month Treasury bill rate; 
INFL is the annual rate of consumer price inflation as measured by the chain price index for 
personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy from the National Income 
and Product Accounts; 
GDPGAP is the percentage deviation of real GDP from potential real GDP as estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO); 
                                                 
7 The uncertainty about the potential GDP and the output gap generally is analogous to the uncertainty about the full 
employment level of the unemployment rate (e.g., the NAIRU). 
8 Note that the approach and interpretation presented here also provides a consistent explanation for results in 
Kitchen (1996) that initially appeared contradictory.  In that study, interest rates, the exchange value of the dollar, 
and precious metals commodity prices all were positively related to higher Federal deficits.  The simultaneous 
positive relationships for the exchange value of the dollar and precious commodity prices seemed to be signaling 
simultaneous positive responses of real interest rates and inflation expectations, or perhaps inflation risk.  The 
framework presented here explains the effect as a positive response of a risk premium related to uncertainty about 
the incidence of the positive response of future real interest rates and/or future inflation. 
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GOVSURP is the Federal government structural budget surplus as a percent of potential nominal 
GDP, based on CBO’s standardized budget surplus estimates (e.g., CBO (2002)). 
Because the evolution of the Federal budget is an annual phenomenon, the data were calculated 
on a Federal fiscal year basis.  The estimation period covers the 1961-2001 fiscal years. 
The choice of variables for the empirical specification warrants some further discussion.  
In the empirical work presented here the measure of the government budget position is the 
Federal structural budget surplus relative to potential GDP.  A more-involved expectations-based 
approach might use a measure of expected structural Federal budget surpluses relative to 
potential GDP over future periods.  But as Kitchen (1996) has shown, movements in longer-term 
budget positions that affect interest rates are closely correlated with movements in the 
contemporaneous year budget position, yielding the result that changes in contemporaneous year 
budget positions typically contain equivalent information to longer-term projected budgets shifts.  
The choice of using the structural budget surplus eliminates the contemporaneous cyclical 
economic effects on the budget variables, establishing a variable that is largely exogenous.   The 
inflation variable enters separately in the estimation without accounting for the targeted inflation 
rate.  This creates the implicit assumption that the inflation target is invariant through time, and 
its effect would be captured as a part of the estimated intercept.  This is a necessary simplifying 
assumption as no reliable measure of the Fed’s target for inflation exists.  Although the omission 
of a variable inflation target (which likely would evolve very slowly over time) in the estimation 
may affect the proper estimation of the inflation parameter, it likely would not have much effect 
on the estimates of the key variable of interest in this study, the coefficient on the structural 
budget surplus.  In the regressions, the current and first lagged values of the GDP output gap 
were included and the sum of those coefficient values is presented in the reported results. 
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 Table 1 shows the estimation results for equation (6).  Generally, the results support the 
interpretation provided above, with most coefficient estimates being significant and of correct 
sign.  The adjusted R-squared values range from 0.264 at the one-year horizon to a relatively 
high 0.642 at the 10-year horizon, and the Durbin-Watson statistics suggest little or no concern 
about serial correlation.  Of particular interest, the coefficients for the structural Federal surplus 
are negative in sign and reliably significant at the usual levels of significance for maturities of 
three years or more.  Likewise, the coefficients on the output gap terms are also of negative sign, 
as hypothesized, and significant at the usual levels.  At the longer-term horizons, the coefficient 
estimates for the inflation variable are of correct sign and are significant.  The notable exception 
to the hypothesized relationships is the inflation coefficient for the term spread for one-year 
Treasury securities.  
 Chart 1 shows the actual and fitted series for the 10-year Treasury security yield to 3-
month Treasury bill rate spread.  The close relationship in the chart provides a visual 
representation of the relatively high adjusted R-squared for the estimated regression. 
k                c        a        b(L)        g SE
Adjusted R-
squared DW
1-year 0.262* 0.050* -0.073** -0.071  0.264 0.406 2.10
(0.109) (0.021) (0.022) (0.040) 
3-year 0.769** -0.050  -0.187** -0.243** 0.438 0.618 1.88
(0.181) (0.035) (0.036) (0.066) 
5-year 0.980** -0.093* -0.155** -0.321** 0.524 0.653 1.68
(0.216) (0.042) (0.029) (0.079) 
10-year 1.182** -0.143** -0.277** -0.421** 0.642 0.654 1.52
(0.265) (0.052) (0.053) (0.097) 
*   represents significant at 0.05 level.
** represents significant at the 0.01 level.
Estimation method: Two-stage least squares, lagged values of variables as explanatory first stage variables.
Table 1 -- Regression Estimates for Long-Term to Short-Term Interest Rate Spread
tjtkt eGOVSURPgGDPGAPLbINFLacii ++++=− )(,,
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Table 2 presents the results for splitting the sample period into two subsamples:  1961-
1978 and 1979-2001.  As is well known, in its efforts to fight the high inflation of the late 1970s, 
the Federal Reserve changed its operating procedures in October 1979 to focus directly on 
targeting monetary aggregates.  The specific policy of targeting the aggregates was relaxed in 
1982, but the increased emphasis of monetary policy on reducing inflation persisted.  In addition, 
the model presented above – and on which the empirical specification was based – uses a Taylor 
rule as a fundamental component, and the Taylor rule has had success in describing the behavior 
of short-term rates largely in the period following the early 1980s. 
The results presented in Table 2 appear to be largely consistent with these interpretations.  
First, the results for the 1979-2001 period (in the bottom half of the table) are similar to the full 
sample results, especially for the estimated coefficients for the structural surplus variable.  Some 
differences are worth discussing, though.  First, the intercept coefficients are somewhat larger, 
Chart 1 -- Actual and Fitted Term Spread
10-Year T-note yield - 3-month T-bill rate
-1.5
0.0
1.5
3.0
4.5
1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000
Fiscal Year
% points
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indicating a larger fixed component of the term premium in the later decades.  Second, the 
coefficient estimates for the inflation variables are more negative and more significant for the 
1979-2001 period compared to the full sample.  That result is consistent with the view that the 
Federal Reserve was more aggressive in adjusting short-term interest rates in reaction to inflation 
in the later period.   Third, the coefficients on the inflation and output gap terms are of similar 
value and roughly of the magnitude that would be consistent with the original Taylor rule 
parameters.  In contrast, the results for the earlier 1961-1978 period provide little support for the 
specification being applied to that earlier period.  Generally, across the explanatory variables, the 
estimated coefficients are not significant, and in particular, are of incorrect sign in most cases for 
the inflation variable.  In summation, the specification appears to work well for the later 1979-
2001 period, but is of less value in application to the earlier 1961-78 period.9   
 
 
 
                                                 
9 This result is similar to results observed in the literature on Taylor rules including Romer (2002). 
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Chart 2 shows the term structure response to the structural Federal budget deficit.  The 
estimated relationships are shown for the 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year term spreads.  At other horizons 
of the term structure, the response is based on interpolations along a polynomial fitted 
relationship.  For the one-year Treasury to three-month Treasury bill spread the estimated effect 
is about 7 basis points per 1 percentage point of structural Federal budget deficit relative to 
k                c        a        b(L)        g SE
Adjusted R-
squared DW
Sample:  1961-1978
1-year 0.214  0.076* -0.070  -0.051  0.224 0.388 1.97
(0.139) (0.034) (0.036) (0.147) 
3-year 0.447  0.048  -0.216** -0.278  0.311 0.712 1.37
(0.238) (0.060) (0.065) (0.344) 
5-year 0.454  0.016  -0.305** -0.542  0.343 0.761 1.58
(0.270) (0.067) (0.073) (0.393) 
10-year 0.335  -0.062  -0.453** -1.064  0.679 0.368 2.13
(0.544) (0.134) (0.147) (0.792) 
Sample:  1979-2001
1-year 0.327  0.027  -0.087  -0.070  0.324 0.270 2.15
(0.188) (0.038) (0.048) (0.058) 
3-year 1.133** -0.156** -0.217** -0.224* 0.444 0.678 2.53
(0.260) (0.053) (0.067) (0.079) 
5-year 1.447** -0.228** -0.260** -0.305** 0.499 0.750 2.50
(0.292) (0.059) (0.075) (0.090) 
10-year 1.700** -0.286** -0.257** -0.426** 0.600 0.754 2.38
(0.353) (0.071) (0.090) (0.109) 
*   represents significant at 0.05 level.
** represents significant at the 0.01 level.
Estimation method: Two-stage least squares, lagged values of variables as explanatory first stage variables.
Table 2 -- Regression Estimates for Alternative Sample Periods
tjtkt eGOVSURPgGDPGAPLbINFLacii ++++=− )(,,
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potential GDP.  The effect rises to 22 basis points at the 3-year horizon, 31 basis points at the 5-
year horizon, and 43 basis points at the 10-year horizon.10 
 
 
IV.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper provides evidence on the responses of the term structure of interest rates to 
Federal budget deficits.  The simple model presented here incorporates the role of monetary 
policy in the determination of short-run interest rates while attributing the effects of government 
budget imbalances on long-term interest rates to uncertainty about the expected future paths of 
inflation and real interest rates.  The empirical specification adopted avoids various problems 
often associated with empirical analysis of budget deficits and interest rates.  The use of the 
                                                 
10 Note that these results are of a somewhat smaller magnitude than those presented in Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 
(2002), where the response was estimated to be in the 40 to 60 basis point range for the 5- and 10-year Treasury 
yields relative to the 3-month Treasury bill rate. 
Chart 2 -- Response of Term Interest Rate Spread to Budget Deficit
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long-term to short-term interest rate spread – made possible by the assumption of a Taylor rule 
type monetary reaction function for short-term interest rates -- avoids the problem of directly 
modeling the level of interest rates.  The use of the structural Federal budget surplus relative to 
potential GDP as an explanatory variable eliminates much, if not all, of the cyclically 
endogenous nature of government budget deficits. 
The regression results support the hypothesis that the term structure of interest rates is 
affected by Federal budget deficits, with a significant positive response of intermediate- and 
long-term interest rates relative to short-term rates in response to structural budget deficits.  The 
estimated effects on interest rates across the term structure show, for example, that a structural 
Federal budget deficit of one percent of potential GDP would boost 5- and 10-year Treasury 
bond yields relative to the Treasury bill rate by about 30 to 40 basis points, respectively.   One 
caveat is that the estimation results indicate that the relationship is more applicable for the post-
1979 period than for the period prior to 1979.  Additional coincidental results from the 
specification employed support the conventional wisdom that monetary policy was more 
oriented toward fighting inflation in the period following 1979 compared to the 1960s and 1970s.  
In general, the results presented in this paper support the view that interest rates in the term 
structure are positively related to structural government budget deficits, although the level of 
interest rates is dependent on the cyclical performance of the economy as well. 
  15
REFERENCES 
 
BARRO, ROBERT J., "The Neoclassical Approach to Fiscal Policy," in Robert J. Barro, ed., Modern 
Business Cycle Theory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989, 178-235. 
 
BERNHEIM, DOUGLAS, "Ricardian Equivalence:  An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence," NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual, 1987, 2, 263-315. 
 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, “The Congressional Budget Resolution and the Economic 
Effects of Balancing the Budget,” The Economic and Budget Outlook:  An Update, August 1995. 
 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, “The Standardized and Cyclically Adjusted Budgets:  Updated 
Estimates,” September 2002. 
 
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, Economic Report of the President, February 1994. 
 
CEBULA, RICHARD J. AND KOCH, JAMES V., “Federal Budget Deficits, Interest Rates, and 
International Capital Flows: A Further Note,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, v34, n1 
(Spring 1994): 117-20. 
 
CANZONERI, MATTHEW B., CUMBY, ROBERT E., AND DIBA, BEHZAD T., “Should the 
European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Be Concerned About Fiscal Policy? September 2002. 
 
ELMENDORF, DOUGLAS W., “The Effect of Deficit-Reduction Laws on Real Interest Rates,” Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics, Discussion Series: 96/44, 1996. 
 
EVANS, CHARLES L. "Real-Time Taylor Rules and the Federal Funds Futures Market." Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives (Third Quarter 1998), pp. 44-55. 
 
EVANS, PAUL, “Do Large Deficits Produce High Interest Rates?”  American Economic Review, March 
1985. 
 
EVANS, PAUL, “Is the Dollar High Because of Large Deficits?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 18, 
1986, 227-249. 
 
EVANS, PAUL, "Interest Rates and Expected Future Budget Deficits in the United States," Journal of 
Political Economy, February 1987 (a). 
 
EVANS, PAUL, "Do Budget Deficits Raise Nominal Interest Rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, 
20, 1987 (b), 281-300. 
 
HOELSCHER, GREGORY, "New Evidence on Deficits and Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking, February 1986. 
 
KITCHEN, JOHN, "Domestic and International Financial Market Responses to Federal Deficit 
Announcements," Journal of International Money and Finance, April 1996, 15:  239-254. 
 
MILLER, STEPHEN M. AND RUSSEK, FRANK S., “The Temporal Causality between Fiscal Deficits 
and Interest Rates,” Contemporary Policy Issues, v9, n3 (July 1991): 12-23  
 
  16
MILLER, STEPHEN M. AND RUSSEK, FRANK S.,  “Do Federal Deficits Affect Interest Rates? 
Evidence from Three Econometric Methods,” Journal of Macroeconomics, v18, n3 (Summer 1996): 403-
28. 
 
ORPHANIDES, ATHANASIOS. "Monetary Rules Based on Real-Time Data." American Economic 
Review, 2001.  
 
PLOSSER, CHARLES, "Fiscal Policy and the Term Structure," Journal of Monetary Economics, 20, 
1987. 
 
ROMER, CHRISTINA D., “A Rehabilitation of Monetary Policy in the 1950s,” NBER Working Paper 
W8800, February 2002. 
 
SEATER, JOHN J., "Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Economic Literature, March 1993, 31, 142-190. 
 
TAYLOR, JOHN, “Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie Rochester Series on Public 
Policy, 39, 1993:  195-214. 
 
THORBECKE, WILLEM, "Why Deficit News Affects Interest Rates," Journal of Policy Modeling, 
February 1993, 15:  1-11. 
 
WACHTEL, PAUL AND YOUNG, JOHN, "Deficit Announcements and Interest Rates," American 
Economic Review, December 1987, 77:  1007-1012. 
 
WOODFORD, MICHAEL, “Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability,” Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 2001: 669-728.  
 
ZIMMERMAN, JEFFREY, “Debt, Deficits, and Long-Term Rates,” Studies in Economics and Finance, 
Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 1997: 63-80. 
 
